NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/2

Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

11 April 2003

Original: English

Second session
Geneva, 28 April-9 May 2003

Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament"

Report submitted by Hungary

1. For the Republic of Hungary, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. Despite recent setbacks, the NPT is still essential to the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, to advance nuclear disarmament and to achieve co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Therefore, Hungary welcomes the decision of the Government of Cuba to adhere to the Treaty, and to join other States parties in their efforts to uphold the integrity of the NPT. Hungary calls on States currently not parties to the NPT to accede to this important instrument.

2. The tragic events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent changes in the international security environment underscore the crucial importance of the NPT. The fight against terrorism and against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery has become the daunting task shared by all members of the international community, and the NPT, with its almost universal membership and wide recognition, remains the single most important multilateral instrument at the disposal of States parties to promote nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament in a verifiable and transparent way.

3. Hungary remains seriously concerned by cases of non-compliance with the NPT and stresses the importance of full implementation of its provisions. We regret the decision of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to withdraw from the Treaty and call upon the Government of the DPRK to reconsider this decision.

4. Hungary attaches great importance to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), since banning nuclear explosions can be considered as a bulwark against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to be one of the first steps towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The efforts to achieve the Treaty's

03-32316 (E) 150403

entry into force must be upheld. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary signed the Joint Ministerial Statement of 14 September 2002, which calls for all states that have not yet signed and ratified the CTBT, in particular those whose ratification is needed for its entry into force, to do so as soon as possible, and also calls upon all states to continue a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. The 2003 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT in Vienna offers another opportunity to draw attention to the goals of the Treaty, and to call upon all States who have not adhered to the Treaty as of yet to do so unconditionally and without delay. Hungary was among the first States to sign the Treaty in 1996, and, as one of the States on the list of 44 whose ratification is indispensable for the entry into force, ratified it in 1999.

5. Hungary considers the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system as an indispensable mechanism to verify compliance with the NPT and at the same time to ensure nuclear transparency. Hungary continues to attach a high priority to the efficient functioning and reliable operation of the IAEA safeguards systems. Hungary actively participated in the negotiation of the Additional Protocol on strengthened IAEA safeguards and was among the first to sign and, since 4 April 2000 to implement such a Protocol. We expect that in 2003 the Agency will draw its conclusion of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activity and thus open the way to the implementation of integrated safeguards in Hungary. Hungary regrets that as of today, only a low number of States have signed and implemented such Additional Protocols. We urge all States parties to take action and sign the Additional Protocol as soon as possible.

Hungary has actively participated in the Agency's safeguards support programme since 1991 and remains committed to continue to do so. Hungary keeps offering its facilities, equipment and experts for training courses for safeguards inspectors. As a new task related to the Additional Protocol, Hungary is providing services in the collection of open sources information as well.

6. Hungary considers the establishment of a well functioning export control mechanism of nuclear material, technology and related dual-use commodities as an important element of the overall non-proliferation regime. Being a supplier of nuclear commodities, Hungary participates in the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group and has an established legal framework of the nuclear export control since the 1980's. In our view an effective and transparent national export control system facilitates cooperation for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

7. Hungary continues to emphasize the fundamental importance of the effective national and international accounting and physical protection regime on nuclear material and equipment for the safe and peaceful use of nuclear installations. Following the tragic events of 11 September 2001 an interagency expert group reviewed and evaluated the threat and defensive preparedness of the Hungarian nuclear installations. In combating illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and other radioactive substances, the prevention and monitoring of the transit of such items have become important cornerstones of Hungary's national strategy.

8. Hungary recognises the major role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the organisation and implementation of the multilateral co-operation stipulated by the Treaty for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy while providing a framework of confidence within which peaceful uses can take place. Hungary is a traditional supporter of the Agency's Technical Co-operation (TC) Program, being both its

beneficiary and also contributing to it. The Hungarian nuclear industry and research has benefited from the Programme for decades while Hungary hosts a number of technical and scientific visits from developing countries every year. Hungary is also actively participating in the comprehensive TC regional programme for Europe, in particular in the field of nuclear power.

9. Hungary continues to support the efforts to start negotiations of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). The Conference on Disarmament (CD), the only multilateral negotiating body for disarmament affairs at the disposal of the international community, remains to be the right instance for such negotiations. During the fifty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly, Hungary, as out-going president tabled the resolution on the work of the CD, which was adopted without a vote. Hungary will support initiatives whose aim is to find a way out of the current deadlock situation, and to induce Member States to take up work on the substantive issues at hand, including the FMCT and nuclear disarmament.

10. Hungary remains fully committed to the NPT, wholeheartedly supporting the strengthened review process of the Treaty. It is in this spirit that Hungary joins the proceedings of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT.